Suchergebnisse

Intensive conversations with members of political parties, closely reading the press, talks with other foreign diplomats, analytical evaluations of many individual events and their contextualization in the wider picture of the situation in Greece allowed Yugoslav diplomats to accurately assess the situation in the country, identify the potential of the military junta and the centers of putschist support in Greece and abroad, follow their showdown with left-wing and democratic options, recognize the ambitions of the putschist regime and the nature of their dictatorship, have insight into the situation of the opposition, make out te contours of a possible state-political system, monitor relations with neighboring countries, closely follow the regime's position to the Macedonian minority, follow the moves of the monarch, assess the permanence of compromises, observe the pressure of the international public and the controversial behavior of the Great Powers, and offer prognoses of the course of events in the near future.Yugoslav diplomats collected some of the relevant information on the situation in Greece in other capitals (London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris…). This information contributed to a wider evaluation of the existing circumstances and a sharper picture of the developments in Greece. The general opinion was that the Yugoslav diplomats were much better informed and more agile than their counterparts from other Eastern European counties, who were seen as "slow", "unsure", '"onfused", "contradictory" and so on. In the days and months following the coup, the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens was a center where many came to be informed, consult with their peers, verify their assessments and hear Belgrade's views. Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, collected information was sent to Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Koča Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Marko Nikezić, Ivan Gošnjak, Petar Stambolić and Ivan Mišković.

Intensive conversations with members of political parties, closely reading the press, talks with other foreign diplomats, analytical evaluations of many individual events and their contextualization in the wider picture of the situation in Greece allowed Yugoslav diplomats to accurately assess the situation in the country, identify the potential of the military junta and the centers of putschist support in Greece and abroad, follow their showdown with left-wing and democratic options, recognize the ambitions of the putschist regime and the nature of their dictatorship, have insight into the situation of the opposition, make out te contours of a possible state-political system, monitor relations with neighboring countries, closely follow the regime's position to the Macedonian minority, follow the moves of the monarch, assess the permanence of compromises, observe the pressure of the international public and the controversial behavior of the Great Powers, and offer prognoses of the course of events in the near future.Yugoslav diplomats collected some of the relevant information on the situation in Greece in other capitals (London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris…). This information contributed to a wider evaluation of the existing circumstances and a sharper picture of the developments in Greece. The general opinion was that the Yugoslav diplomats were much better informed and more agile than their counterparts from other Eastern European counties, who were seen as "slow", "unsure", '"onfused", "contradictory" and so on. In the days and months following the coup, the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens was a center where many came to be informed, consult with their peers, verify their assessments and hear Belgrade's views. Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, collected information was sent to Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Koča Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Marko Nikezić, Ivan Gošnjak, Petar Stambolić and Ivan Mišković.

U radu se ukazuje na početke jugoslovensko-indonežanskih odnosa 50-tih godina XX veka. Pisan je na osnovu arhivskih istraživanja i literature. ; New situation in Yugoslav foreign policy and orientation towards the 'Third world' countries led to Yugoslav - Indonesian rapprochement. In that way, during 50's perspectives of Yugoslav cooperation with Indonesia have opened. In the beginning, Yugoslavia used to collect information from different sources (press, diplomatic reports, etc) realizing 'complexity' of Indonesian - Dutch relations. Yugoslavia recognized Indonesia soon after the proclamation of independence. Diplomatic missions have been established in 1955 and in following year they were upgraded to the level of embassies. Political contacts opened possibilities for economical, cultural and other kinds of cooperation. Meetings of two head of states, Tito and Sukarno, have contributed in large extent to expansion of bilateral cooperation.

Rad se bavi vezama Jugoslavije i Čehoslovačke u drugoj polovini šezdesetih godina i složenim odnosima koji su Beograd i Prag povezivali sa politikom Varšavskog pakta i SSSR-a. ; The paper deals with the intensity of the relations between Prague and Belgrade. The meetings of many eminent statesmen and politicians of two countries and constant diplomatic contacts facilitated that Josip Broz Tito and the party-state leadership of Yugoslavia were very well informed about the events in Czechoslovakia during 1967 and 1968. Indirectly, the paper concerns the Yugoslav impact on the part of the Czechoslovakia's leadership and the complexity of the relations that connected Prague and Belgrade with the policy of the Warsaw's Treaty and the USSR.

Osnovni cilj ovog rada, zasnovanog na izvornoj građi, jeste da objasni bezbednosne, političke, vojne i međuetničke prilike na prostoru Treće armijske oblasti (teritorija Kosova i Metohije) u vreme državnog provizorijuma u Kraljevini SHS. ; The author's analysis, based on ample archival sources, of events and processes taking place in Kosovo and Metohija in the first half of 1920 points to the existence of specific political and security conditions created by the resistance of the Albanian population. The civil and military authorities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes endeavored to suppress anarchy, prevent internal rebellion and the spreading of Italian and Albanian propaganda promulgating the formation of Greater Albania, and to aid the rebuilding of the Albanian state within the borders which had been internationally recognized in 1913. In anticipation of the Paris Peace Conference final decision regarding the solution of the Albanian question Yugoslav civil and military authorities tried to prevent anarchy in the districts and municipalities of Prizren, Zvecan, Kosovo, and Metohija. Despite these efforts the situation remained unstable as a result of the authorities' inability to persuade members of the Albanian population to consider themselves Yugoslav citizens, thus forming the basis for the precarious political and security conditions in Kosovo, Metohija, western Macedonia, and the peripheral areas of Montenegro in 1920.